




NEWSLETTER

NO. 94-3 -- *SPECIAL EDITION* -- JUL 94



HAITI



CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)
U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER (CAC)
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-7000



FOREWORD

July 1994

This publication is for those forces who could possibly deploy to Haiti to provide humanitarian assistance to the populace and assist in the restoration of democracy.

This Special Edition CALL publication introduces Haiti, provides insights into Operations Other Than War, highlights major preventive medicine lessons, provides Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for the soldier and presents Haitian customs. The information in this Special Edition does not replicate that presently found in doctrinal publications. It is not intended to serve as a program to guide the conduct of operations and training. Rather, this newsletter is designed to highlight information and lessons that are applicable to the unique environment offered by the Haitian humanitarian assistance operations.

The Haitian effort poses many unique challenges not faced by our military forces in recent operations. Of utmost concern is the need to care for the health and welfare of deployed U.S. forces. Disease, the lack of sanitation and death are daily circumstances associated with the collapse of the Haitian governmental infrastructure.

CALL thanks those persons of the 1st Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group (FOG), and the Foreign Military Studies Office (FSMO), U. S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), who shared their insights and experiences. This information and TTP are provided for your use and dissemination. If your unit has identified other relevant lessons or information, please share them with the rest of the U.S. Army by contacting CALL at DSN 552-2255 or 4317. Comments concerning this newsletter should be addressed to Commander, Combined Arms Command, ATTN: ATZL-CTL, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-7000.

***HAITI ***
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of funds for printing this publication has been approved by Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1985, IAW AR 25-30. Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

NOTE: Any publications referenced in this newsletter (other than the CALL newsletters), such as ARs, FM's, TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system!

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CHAPTER I

An Introduction to Haiti

GEOGRAPHY:

Haiti is situated some 750 miles southeast of Miami, FL, and occupies the western third of the island of Hispaniola, which it shares with the Dominican Republic. Haiti has a land mass of 10,714 square miles. Haiti, an Indian word meaning "mountains," is made up of extremely mountainous country of which only 20 percent of the territory lies below 600 feet. The highest mountain in Haiti (Chain de la Sel) is almost 9,000 feet above sea level.

Haiti's ecology has been damaged since its independence in 1804. Only seven percent of the country's original forest remains unscathed by deforestation. Most of the trees have been cut down and used as firewood for heating and cooking. Some wood has been sold to surrounding island nations to provide much needed income. Massive soil erosion has also occurred due to the vast amount of deforestation. Thus, much of the soil in Haiti has been depleted of vital minerals. Most of the water in Haiti is also polluted. This includes parts of the coastal areas, such as the bay of Port-au-Prince, and most of the major ports and some coastal towns. The water throughout the country is nonpotable.

CLIMATE:

The climate in Haiti is tropical with average temperatures ranging from 80 degrees in January to 86 degrees in July. There are also two rainy seasons. The first runs from April to June and the second between October and November. Like in all Caribbean countries, hurricanes are prevalent.

THE PEOPLE:

Haitian society is divided into black persons of African descent who constitute 95 percent of the population, mulattoes of mixed African and European stock, and a few Europeans. More than 70 percent of the population lives in rural areas.

LANGUAGE:

While the official language is French, 90 percent of the people speak Creole exclusively. The adult literacy rate is very low, averaging 23 percent at best.

RELIGION:

Ninety-five percent of all Haitians are Roman Catholics. The other five percent practice protestant religions. In conjunction with these religions, in particular with the Roman Catholic, Haitians practice voodoo. The religious ceremonies involved in the practice of the voodoo religion are usually closed to foreigners. They usually involve music, dancing and sacrifices of sorts depending on what the practitioners want to accomplish.

There have been distinctions made between *Voudun* and *Vaudun*

Voudun is considered black magic or the evil branch. Vaudun is considered white magic or the good branch. Most people do not make a distinction between the two branches, since both are practiced by all depending on what they want to do. Some terms and definitions follow:

Ason - Sacred rattle of the priest or priestess. Made of dried gourd with trade beads of different colors strung on the outside. Dried snakes' vertebrae may also be strung.

Bukulou - An evil and mischievous demon, a werewolf whose evil spirit is nourished by human flesh.

Damballa - the snake god who rules the voodoo cult.

Erzulie - The mistress of Damballa and a ruler.

Freda - The wife of Damballa and a ruler.

Guede - The god of death.

Baron Samedi - The god of cemeteries.

Loa - The spirit or god who possesses people during cult ceremonies. Originally from Africa, the loa may take residence in the head or occupy the entire body. Services to the loas are the chief means of perpetuating practices brought from Africa by the slaves.

Boko - A cult priest who practices divining or magic in addition to working with the loa and the dead.

Bosal - A wild, untamed and unclean spirit. Also one not yet inducted into the voodoo cult.

Hounsi - An acolyte to the voodoo; servitor of the gods or loa who has been "tamed" or controlled. May be male or female.

Dyab - Devil.

Gri-gri - Fetish; talisman, magical charm; bird used in making charm.

Cheval - Horse; person "mounted," or possessed, by god or loa.

Houngfor - The voodoo temple, structure dedicated to the Haitian loa of gods for permanent housing and ceremonial offerings; repository of artifacts associated with, and of, the mystic spirit of the gods.

La Plase - Chief assistant of the hougan. Assumes responsibility for running the houngfor in the absence of his chief.

Hougun - Officiating priest of the voodoo.

Mambo - Officiating priestess of the voodoo.

Ouanga - Aggressive magic; charm; spell.

Veve - Ceremonial drawing made of meal or flour on the ground by the hougan.

HEALTH AND DISEASE IN HAITI:

Malaria: Malaria exists countrywide throughout the entire year. Data from 1989 indicates that 23,000 cases were recorded.

*** AIDS:**

The blood supply may not be adequately screened, and single-use, disposable needles and syringes may not be available. When possible, travelers should defer medical treatment until reaching a facility where safety can be assured. (Reports indicate that 50 percent of Haitian prostitutes carry the AIDS virus and that about four of every 10 AIDS victims are female.)

***Tuberculosis (TB):**

It is estimated that about 10 percent of the population has TB. It is present throughout the country.

Other Diseases:

Insect-borne illness: outbreaks of dengue fever and dengue hemorrhagic fever occur.

* Filariasis (Bancroftian type) occurs.

* Tularemia - occurs.

Food-borne and water-borne illness, such as bacillary and amoebic dysentery, are common.

*Poliomyelitis--prevalent.

Other hazards:

* Animal rabies, particularly in the mongoose, is reported in some areas.

* Coral and jellyfish may present problems.

KEY POLITICAL AND MILITARY PERSONALITIES:

President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Jean Bertrand Aristide is the first democratically elected President of Haiti. He is a former priest who is very popular among the lower class Haitians. His symbol was the black chicken during the presidential election. He won the election by taking 67 percent of the popular vote. After seven months as President, he was ousted in a coup by the Haitian military.

Lieutenant-General Raoul Cedras.

Lt-General Cedras is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Haiti (FAD'H). He has held this position since July 1991, when he was appointed by President Aristide. When Prime Minister Marc Bazin stepped down from power, Lt-General Cedras became the DeFacto leader of Haiti. He was also the Haitian representative in the New York talks with President Aristide. Lt-General Cedras has agreed to resign upon President Aristide's return to Haiti.

Brigadier General Philippe Biamby

Brigadier General Biamby currently holds the position of Chief of the General Staff. He was appointed to this position in February 1992, after President Aristide's ouster. He has attended the U. S. Army Infantry Officer Basic Course at Ft Benning, GA, and is a very influential leader in Haiti.

Major General Jean Claude Duperval.

Major General Duperval is the Assistant Commander in Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces (FAD'H) and has held this position since February 1992. He served for nearly 13 years in an Infantry Unit and has attended the U.S. Army Adjutant General Officer basic course. He also served in the Port-au-Prince Police as S2 and later as its Chief in the 1989-90 period.

Lieutenant Colonel Michel Francois.

Lieutenant Colonel Francois has been the Commander of the Port-au-Prince Police since the coup which ousted President Aristide in October 1991. LTC Francois received training in the United States when he attended the Infantry Officer basic course at Ft Benning, GA. He has been asked to resign from his position by President Aristide, but has not yet done so.

Prime Minister Robert Malval.

Robert Malval was picked by President Aristide to be the Prime Minister of Haiti. Malval was ratified by the Haitian Parliament, and sworn in by Aristide in Washington, D. C. Malval is a former newspaper publisher. His priorities as Prime Minister include reconciliation, creating jobs, and rescuing the economy.

SIGNIFICANT DATES AND HOLIDAYS:

DATE	HOLIDAY
JAN 01	INDEPENDENCE DAY (1804)
JAN 02	NATIONAL HEROES DAY/ANCESTOR'S DAY
FEB 07	ANNIVERSARY OF DUVALIER' S FALL FROM POWER (1986)
APR 07	ANNIVERSARY OF TOUSSAINT'S DEATH (1801)
APR 14	PAN AMERICAN DAY
APR 21	JEAN CLAUDE DUVALIER INSTALLED AS PRESIDENT FOR LIFE. ANNIVERSARY OF DEATH OF FRANCOIS DUVALIER
MAY 01	AGRICULTURE DAY
MAY 18	FLAG DAY/UNIVERSITY DAY
JUL 28	COMMEMORATIONOF U. S. INTERVENTION (1915)
JUL 29	DAY OF DUVALIERIST MILITIA
AUG 15	ASSUMPTION
SEP 22	ANNIVERSARY OF DUVALIERIST REVOLUTION
SEP 29	MICHAELMAR/FEAST OF ST. MICHAEL AND ALL ANGELS
OCT 06	OCTOBER DAY
OCT 05-26	VOTER REGISTRATION DAY
NOV 01	ALL SAINT'S DAY
NOV 02	MEMORIAL DAY/ALL SAINT'S DAY
NOV 11	MARTINRAS
NOV 18	ARMED FORCES DAY
DEC 05	DISCOVERY DAY (1491)
DEC 16	ELECTION DAY
DEC 25	CHRISTMAS DAY
DEC 31	ST SILVESTER'S DAY/NEW YEAR'S EVE

***NOTE: MARDI GRAS AND GOOD FRIDAY DATES VARY FROM
YEAR TO YEAR.***

POISONOUS PLANTS

* The black nightshade is a soft-stemmed, weedy-looking plant, about 91 centimeters high. The berries are considered poisonous. It has small, light purple or white flowers. The fruit is a small blackish-purple berry with numerous seeds. It is also called the garden huckleberry.

* The black poisonwood bush or small tree has thin russet bark, small white flowers, and yellow-orange berries. The sap causes blisters and prolonged inflammations similar to poison ivy. Also, if the wood is burned, the smoke can be an irritant.

* The coral bean has bright red flowers and a bean-like seed that is either bright red or red and black. The beans grow on a plant that can be either a bush or small tree and has hard spines.

* Cow-itch (also known as cowage, velvet bean, and pica-pica) is common to the plains areas. It is a low bush plant with hard seed pods that are covered by stiff hairs or bristles. These hairs can be easily separated from the pod and carried by the wind. The hairs can penetrate the skin and cause intense itching and irritation which lasts a long while. If the hairs get lodged in the eye, damage can occur.


* The dasheen (also known as coco-yam, coco, eddoes, malanga, malonqa yautia, and papamalangq) grows in the sandy soils of the lowlands. The underground tuber is poisonous and causes intense burning and swelling in the mouth and throat.

* Dumbcane is a plant found in the lowlands and wet areas. It has a milky sap that causes severe blistering and inflammation of the skin. The sap appears when the stems or leaves are broken open. If the plant is cut with a sharp instrument, it will give off an offensive skunk-like odor. The stems and portions of the roots grow along the ground.

* The guao is a small tree that has a long leaf stem with few or no branches. The leaves of this tree are very spiny and are clustered at the ends of the branches. The flowers are small and greenish. The sap of this plant causes blistering and long-term inflammation of the skin, something like poison ivy.

* Manclineel (or manzanillo) is a plant found only in dense thickets along the ocean beaches. It is a small tree, pale brown, with smooth bark, and very small green flowers. The fruit of this plant looks like small green apples. The sap is milky and causes blistering and inflammation of the skin. If the wood is burned, the smoke from the fire may cause eye injuries.

* The nettle tree is found most commonly growing at low and middle altitudes. Physical contact with the leaves or branches of this plant can be extremely painful. The irritation may last more than 24 hours. No permanent injury occurs from the spine, and there is no need for professional medical treatment. Many people plant this tree as a hedge.




* Physic nut trees (also known as pinon, tempale, conquillo, coquito, and tartago) are commonly found in the lowlands where they are planted for hedges or live fence posts. This bush or small tree has small greenish-yellow flowers. The seed pods contain two or three large oily seeds. The raw seeds or nuts of this plant are poisonous and can be violently cathartic.

* The poison spurge plant (also known as yerba mala, barrabas, and yerba lechera) grows in the lower mountain regions. It can take the form of a small tree or bush. It has close pale bark and is often planted as a living fence post. The sap is milky, and the flowers are small and white. The milky sap will produce blisters and intense inflammation of the skin similar to poison ivy.

* The sandbox tree (also known as jabillo and javillo) can be found growing at low altitudes. It has a trunk that is closely covered with short, sharp spines. The fruit is shaped like a small melon or pumpkin. The milky sap is used to catch fish. It is mixed with sand, then thrown into still bodies of water to stupefy the fish. The sap also causes severe irritation to the skin. Its woody fruits are dangerous to handle because when they dry they explode with a loud shot-like sound. The exploding pods scatter poisonous seeds in all directions.

* The white poison wood tree (also known as chechem ce caballo, maboq, and kutiar) has slender twigs, ashy gray bark, and white flowers. The sap will cause blisters and severe inflammation of the skin.

NOTE: These plants are pictured in Appendices B and C, FM 21-76.



CHAPTER II

Current Situation in Haiti

The social, political, and religious factors as they exist now in Haiti will have an impact on military planning for Haitian contingencies, as will the military establishment described below.

A BROKEN COUNTRY

Haiti is a country in which nearly everything needs help. The unsettled political situation and sinking economic vitality, exacerbated by the U. S. embargo since autumn 1991, has left Haiti in disarray. In Port-au-Prince and other built-up areas, electricity is produced but 10 hours a day, and water (nonpotable) is available about one hour a day. Garbage is collected intermittently, and transportation is difficult.

Public transportation is unreliable, and although seemingly chaotic to people experienced with modern mass-transit, the brightly colored jitneys or tap-taps (buses) work well enough to service Haiti's limited infrastructure. Roads throughout the nation are in disrepair to the extent that vehicles cannot negotiate the potholes without suffering damage to tires and suspension - and the embargo has ensured that repair parts are out of reach. While there are no apparent cases of starvation, there is malnutrition, and deaths among the very young can be traced to sanitation, diet, a lack of available medical care and pharmaceutical products.

In a larger sense it has been observed that "everything has fallen apart." "What we really need," said one resident in Port-au-Prince, "is help putting Haitians back to work building the national infrastructure: hospitals, roads, bridges, wells, electricity, schools, and port facilities, along with the institutional know-how to make things work."

HEALTH PROBLEMS

Haitian medical care faces serious challenges in what is essentially a nation of sick people. The Pan-American Health Organization, a branch of the World Health Organization, released a study in March 1991 stating that one in 10 pregnant women in Haiti is now found to be infected with the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) virus. Early in 1993 in Guantanamo Naval Base, where Haitian "boat people" were held pending resolution of their immigration status, Haitians were either HIV-positive or the children of these people. Of 179 migrants, 153 were HIV-positive. Within Haiti today, about 9 percent of the people are now infected with the virus. AIDS has become a serious problem in Haiti although it is estimated that only 20 percent of the AIDS cases have been reported through 1989 Haiti could have well over half a million people who are now HIV positive.

About 10 percent of Haiti's population (over half a million people) suffers from tuberculosis. Syphilis, gonorrhea, viral hepatitis, typhoid fever, malaria, and acute diarrheal disease are endemic in the population. There is no viable medical infrastructure to provide care on a nationwide basis, although private, internationally funded hospitals such as, l'Hopital Albert Schweitzer at Deschapelles (in the Artibonite valley, 38 air miles north of Port-au-Prince), provide help to local people. The health care provided to people through the four-tier system (State University Hospital, regional hospital, commune health center, and dispensary) is not effective.

POVERTY BRINGS MISERY

Prior to the September 1991 coup, Haiti had an unemployment rate of 60 percent. It has been estimated that 90 percent of the population lives on less than \$100 a year. The wealth is concentrated in only 4.5 percent of the population. As economic conditions have continued to deteriorate in this small country, many of the poor peasants have cut down trees to build huts or to make charcoal to sell. But straddling the hurricane belt, Haiti is subject to severe storms and the resultant deforestation has caused extensive erosion. This has hurt the agriculture and fishing industries. Following heavy rains, the waters around the island become muddied, killing the fish.

Socially, 95 percent of the population is black while the remaining 5 percent are mainly mulattos or white. This 5 percent controls approximately 95 percent of the wealth of the country. With most living in abject poverty, Haitian life expectancy is just over 50 years. Many people who have not been able to earn a living in the countryside have fled to the capital city of Port-au-Prince, crowding into and expanding the slum areas, thus increasing their vulnerability to a myriad of diseases.

POLITICS AND RELIGION

Elections have not been held routinely, and political parties are not well-organized. The parties provide a focal point for galvanizing support around a charismatic personage. Real power has often centered on the country's leader and a small elite group who have used a system of counterbalances to prevent a coup. A continuing source of political influence in Haiti has been religion. With a long history of dictatorship and poverty, the masses have depended on religion for help. Although approximately 95 percent of the population is Roman Catholic, a vast majority of Haitians also practice Voodoo as an extension of their African heritage and culture. Political leaders have often taken advantage of the Roman Catholic pulpit, or the black magic of voodoo, to help influence the masses.

Religion, with its juxtaposition of traditional Catholicism and voodoo, has played a key role in the maintenance of power in Haiti. The Roman Catholic Church, enjoying a large percentage of popular participation, has often encouraged peace and acceptance. It is argued that the church has supported the elite in some cases, preaching politics from the pulpit.

Through the Duvalier era, the Catholic Church accommodated the dictatorship. After Francois Duvalier attempted to work with the Church, he finally expelled the Jesuit Order and recruited loyal Tonton Makout priests. "The ascendance of makout priests to positions of authority means that injustices were committed against those who were not aligned with Duvalier politically." Leadership posts went to Duvalier supporters. Also within the country, there has been a strong influence of "liberation" theology which has encouraged radical change in the political system of the country.

Today the politicalization of religion in Haiti is best personified in the Reverend Jean-Bertrand Aristide, but there are other examples. After the February 16, 1993, sinking of the ferry boat Neptune, Aristide supporter Bishop Willy Romelus used a funeral Mass for the 600-900 victims of the disaster as a political rally. Romelus presided over 2,500 Haitians chanting, "Aristide or death!" His target was the current military government. He was allegedly attacked by right-wing demonstrators as he left the church services attended by UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) observers. However, some observers suggest that this was staged by Romelus to discredit the military-backed government.

THE HAITIAN ARMED FORCES

The military has traditionally been a critical factor for maintaining power within Haiti. In the recent past, Haitian defense expenditures have risen from \$14 million in 1990 to \$21 million in 1991, about 1.5 percent of the gross domestic product.

The armed forces and security forces of about 8,100 active duty personnel (900 officers and senior noncommissioned officers, 7,200 enlisted) include some 6,200 in the army, a small navy and air corps of around 300 people each, plus about 1,300 civil police in Port-au-Prince, and a handful of other security specialists related to fire fighting, customs and immigration. Working under the 1987 Constitution, the Minister of National Defense is also the Minister of the Interior. The Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces (FAD'H) is appointed by the President and has operational control over all of these critical public safety and military functions.

The FAD'H is organized into nine military departments and the Metropolitan Region (Port-au-Prince) to reflect the geographic regions of the country. Command of the FAD'H is centralized in the General Staff Headquarters and in the nine department headquarters. Each department is divided into districts which correspond to company areas of responsibility. Because the FAD'H has administered the nation at the departments as well as at the rural communal section levels, the military has traditionally enjoyed great influence over the daily activities of the Haitian people.

The Haitian Army has depended on foreign arms imports. The result is an arsenal of old and ineffective equipment from many countries, such as five V-150 light armored vehicles (most mobile and effective system in the FAD'H), plus assorted small arms and mortars (e.g., two 90-mm guns and three 20-mm machine guns). The air corps has but two dozen varied fixed-wing aircraft and about eight helicopters (usually inoperative) representing no serious threat in the Caribbean. However, these limited systems give the armed forces sufficient clout to maintain internal security, their traditional role.

The balance of power in the Haitian experience has been designed to maintain complete power in a single person, supported by the military. This domination by power not only has required ensuring security within the state (control of the masses), but also maintaining power bases within the establishment infrastructure to make sure that the dictator did not encounter power centers he could not control.

TONTON MAKOUTS

This segment explains Duvalier's development of Volunteers for National Security (VNS), better known as the tonton makouts, a militia-style secret police force which became more powerful than the army. If the Presidential Guard maintained power in Port-au-Prince, the tonton makouts extended Duvalier's authority over the army and into the countryside through civil mobilization, terror and patronage. The methods of the tonton makouts were bribery, intimidation, and extortion.

One regional expert says that "Today, the tonton makouts remain alive in the minds of a lot of people but no longer exist." In Haiti's current political crisis, both Aristide and army supporters have alleged that the other faction has developed a similar organization. Aristide is alleged to have tried unsuccessfully to develop his own support group, but failed; the army may have several hundred "attaches," sympathizers who earn influence and prerequisites (a gun, or a radio) for their support. Other infrastructures, which could challenge the absolute control of the leadership, have not been allowed to exist.

METROPOLITAN REGION

The seat of military power is located in the metropolitan region of Port-au-Prince where the General Staff and the Port-au-Prince police share pre-eminence. The Metropolitan Police have 10 companies (and other units, i.e., as antigang) located in the capital, responsible for routine police activities, such as maintaining order and traffic control, as well as eliminating drug smuggling. The police operate somewhat independently of the military. In recent months, the chief of police, Colonel Michel Francois, has had an adversarial relationship with the Haitian Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras.

The officers of the General Staff directly control the General Headquarters units which include five infantry companies and a separate and independent Heavy Weapons Company (mortars, armored vehicles, artillery) located on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince. The Heavy Weapons Company and Port-au-Prince police have demonstrated an acrimonious relationship in the past year.

Elements of the "Presidential Guard" are found at the presidential palace. Such units are hand-picked infantry elements of the old Presidential guard, now called the Headquarters Defense Force (HDF).

They are among the best equipped forces in the country. Under the Guard (literally -- in the basement of the Presidential Palace) is control of the national arsenal which is packed with small arms, mortars, and ammunition dating from World War II. Central control over the deteriorating hoard is maintained jointly by the commander of the Guard and the President. Heavy Weapons Company ammunition is stored at Fort Dimanche, in the southern metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. Counterbalancing the old Guard companies and the Police have been two other tactical units of significance.

The Dessalines Battalion was a 750-man force at the Dessalines barracks, located to the rear of the Presidential Palace. In the later 1980s, it was commanded by the violent and corrupt narcotrafficker Colonel Jean Claude Paul. His battalion was alleged by the U. S. government to have "created much of the mayhem that left 34 people dead in the aborted November (1987) election that was to be Haiti's first experiment in democracy in three decades." Indicted in March 1988 by the state of Florida for cocaine trafficking, Colonel Paul was poisoned eating pumpkin soup that November; his battalion was disbanded in April 1989 after interarmy battles.

A second unit, the 700-man Leopards Corps, initially designed to be a counterinsurgency unit, largely performed police functions. After the coup attempt of 1989, it was disbanded.

The remainder of the army is under the North and South Regional Commands, scattered throughout the country in small groups, often under the command of a junior noncommissioned officer. Poorly armed, equipped, and paid, these forces are often left to fend for themselves with little more than a gun and a pair of sunglasses. Such groups have created a method of effecting control in rural areas through a system of bribes and extortion.

THE MILITARY AND ILLICIT DRUGS

Since the death of Colonel Paul, commander of the Dessalines Battalion, there continues to be credible reports that involve members of the military (and police) in narcotrafficking.

Although small amounts of marijuana are grown in Haiti, it is not a commercial drug producer. Rather, the poor communications and transportation infrastructure, plus the ineffectiveness of the military, police and judicial systems have created conditions in Haiti wherein trans-shipment of illicit drugs is difficult to control. The FAD'H Anti-Drug Service conducts occasional drug seizures; however, lack of funding and equipment causes the counterdrug effort to be largely ineffective. Also, military and police personnel are vulnerable to penetration by drug criminals, making the nation well suited as a cocaine trans-shipment point.

Reports show that there have been some increases in air and surface drug shipments to Haiti since the Aristide coup. And while the de facto government has maintained counterdrug operations at or above the tempo before the coup, Haiti's judicial system is ineffective in bringing drug traffickers to justice. Equally disturbing is the report of the "increased use of crack cocaine by military personnel."

MILITARY SOLIDARITY OR SCHISM?


Seemingly the Haitian military is the a type of powerful political monolith common to emerging countries, but the result of the Duvalier era was a schismatized armed force. This renders Haitian politics all the more complex and less predictable.

Lacking a Noncommissioned Officer Corps in the modern sense, the armed forces leadership resides solely in the officer corps.

As Francois Duvalier consolidated his power, he sent hand-picked groups of cadets to the Freres Military Academy, Haiti's West Point. These were mostly black youths who represented Duvalier's middle class, and it was expected that they would be sympathetic to the regime. But in 1961, Papa Doc Duvalier closed the military academy seeking a more loyal following within the enlisted ranks. Members of the last class ('61) included Prosper Avril, Haiti's last military ruler before Aristide; also, there was Herard Abraham who followed Avril, to turn political power over to Judge Ertha Trouillot, and assist with the December 1990 elections.

For 10 years following the closing of the academy, Papa Doc commissioned officers from within the enlisted ranks, and his intent was to place blacks in positions of power. This group, whose military qualification for maintaining a commission was total loyalty, has remained a symbol of Duvalierism.

In 1971 Jean-Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier opened the academy for the children of his friends and supporters; these were mainly cadets from mulatto families. This symbolized a return to the elite bourgeoisie of an earlier era, and these officers were scorned by their seniors. Thus, even within the military leadership, there are officer groups of different backgrounds and loyalties.



THE FLAG OF HAITI

CHAPTER III

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) in Support of Operations other than War

TOPIC: Checkpoints.

DISCUSSION: Checkpoints are often scenes of violence or have the threat of violence. Leaders must take into consideration those instructions given to personnel who man these points. Rules of engagement must be clear, but flexible to accommodate rapid changes in any situation that may develop. During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, one technique used was called a "flying checkpoint." Mobile units, usually consisting of mounted infantry, combat engineers, and TOW vehicles overwatched by attack helicopters, moved forward to key intersections in areas where armed Iraqi or guerrilla fighters were known to operate and set up hasty roadblocks to disrupt unauthorized or unwanted military activity. This mission always required designating soldiers to detain and search intruders, a sizeable element to overwatch the checkpoint, air cover on station, mobile mortar support, and a quick reinforcement force of TOW and infantry carriers that could extract or reinforce the flying checkpoint. Leaders should also ensure that checkpoints are designed so that only the minimum number of soldiers are exposed at any given time and that they are covered by automatic weapons when they are exposed.

LESSON(S):

It is imperative that reinforcement and counterattack plans be made and rehearsed. Units, during other operations, have developed situational exercises to train soldiers on checkpoint procedures. Included are a few examples of these situational exercises:

SITUATION	RESPONSE (A TECHNIQUE)
Receive Sniper Fire	Take cover; employ smoke, protect wounded; identify location of sniper; REPORT; respond IAW ROE.
Projectiles Thrown	REPORT; protect self/others; do not throw objects back.
Imminent Harm	Protect yourself/others; use force IAW ROE; REPORT.
Civilian Casualty	REPORT; provide first aid.
Drive-By Shooting	Take cover; REPORT; respond with force IAW ROE.
NOTE: Execute response IAW the JTF ROE.	

TOPIC: Checkpoint Tactics.

DISCUSSION: A high volume of pedestrian and vehicle traffic can be expected to pass through a checkpoint. The normal congestion at checkpoints can be compounded by undisciplined driving habits of local people and by a shortage of soldiers able to speak the local language. Combatants usually develop techniques and ruses to get weapons and explosives through checkpoints.

LESSON(S):

- * Expect the unexpected at checkpoints.
- * Develop and rehearse drills to prepare soldiers for all possible situations at checkpoints.
- * Some belligerent techniques and suggested responses are:

Action: Place guns or explosives in vehicle fuel tanks or inside of component parts of vehicles.

Counter-Action: Rehearse vehicle search techniques. Develop a checklist for soldiers to use and obtain the proper equipment to conduct a search of vehicles (large mirrors to inspect the undercarriage of vehicles, bolt cutters to cut locks). Don't rush the search, just because traffic backs up.

Action: Weapons, explosives, and combatants can be concealed in hearses and ambulances instead of on bodies or wounded civilians.

Counter-Action: Treat these vehicles with respect, but develop drills for searching vehicles or verifying wounds.

Action: Create a diversion to sneak or rush through a checkpoint. Commonly used techniques are: a sniper attack; an ambulance arriving at the checkpoint with sirens blaring; staging fights or riots near the checkpoint; and staging a vehicle accident or starting a fire.

Counter-Action: Develop drills and techniques to rapidly emplace barricades to stop both vehicle and pedestrian traffic. Establish signals or code words to initiate closure operations. Use a quick-reaction team at each roadblock to handle unexpected situations so checkpoint personnel do not have to leave their post.

Action: Using females to smuggle weapons and explosives.

Counter-Action: Develop techniques to search females. Male soldiers should not physically touch females. Use female soldiers to search female civilians. Use metal detectors or mine detectors to scan individuals for weapons. The detectors may not detect explosives.

TOPIC: Checkpoint Guidelines.

DISCUSSION: The following "DO's" and "DON'Ts" can assist in training soldiers for checkpoint duty.

LESSON(S):

DO's

- * Smile when approaching a vehicle and talking to the driver.
- * Speak to the driver and let him speak to the passengers.
- * Ask the driver politely to do what you want him to do.
- * Speak naturally and no louder than needed.
- * When searching a person, be courteous. Use scanners and metal detectors whenever possible.
- * Whatever happens at the checkpoint, stay calm, and make a special effort to be polite, regardless of your feelings.
- * Always maintain a high standard of dress and military bearing.

DON'Ts

- * Be disrespectful or give any hint of dislike.
- * Put your head or arm in through the side window or open the door without permission.
- * Shout or show impatience.
- * Frisk women or tell them to put their hands up. Do not point a weapon directly at a woman unless essential for security reasons.
- * Become involved in a heated argument. Do not use force unless force is used against you and then use only the minimum necessary. Do not hesitate to call your checkpoint commander whenever the need arises.
- * Become careless or sloppy in appearance. If you look smart and professional, people are more likely to accept your authority and be willing to cooperate.

TOPIC: Situational Training Considerations.

DISCUSSION: Units will encounter situations for which they normally do not train. These situations will present challenges to the leaders and generate confusion and stress which soldiers have to deal with. Each unit should develop a training program to familiarize soldiers with anticipated problems they might encounter. These situational exercises can easily turn into battle drills for each unit. Some examples are:

- * Receive appeal for medical assistance.
- * Civilian criminal is apprehended.
- * Crowd mobs food distribution truck/center.
- * Land mine is discovered.
- * Dead body is found.
- * Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) individual asks for medical treatment.
- * NGO individual asks for transportation on military vehicle.

LESSON(S): Develop situational training exercises to prepare soldiers for unexpected problems/dilemmas. The unit commander must prepare the proper responses for their soldiers. These responses are a method to express the commander's intent for the operation. Turn the responses into battle drills so that unexpected situations become routine operations for the soldier.

TOPIC: Rules of Engagement (ROE).

DISCUSSION: ROE lessons are useful to leaders at all levels who are planning other-than-war operations or who are preparing units for peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. The lessons focus on, and amplify, key aspects of ROE. Tactical leaders should consider these lessons and incorporate them into unit training and operations.

PURPOSE: ROE must preclude indiscriminate use of deadly force while simultaneously allowing soldiers sufficient latitude to defend themselves. The fundamental premise of self-defense must be sustained. Soldiers must believe they can survive within the rules; ROE must meet their hierarchy of needs. Viewed in this context, ROE are soldier support factors as well as operational or tactical parameters.

DEVELOPMENT: ROE must be skillfully integrated into a combination of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian support operations, carefully tailored to comply with operational and political concerns.

MEASURED RESPONSE: ROE must incorporate criteria which clearly outline the application of a graduated use of force to provide the balance needed to defuse, escalate, or otherwise resolve and confrontation. The degree of force used to neutralize a threat should conform to the circumstances of the incident. Defining ROE in terms of graduated levels of response enables tactical elements to apply the force necessary to meet varying levels of violence which characterize peacekeeping and peace enforcement environments-while minimizing collateral damage.

DISSEMINATION: ROE must be published in writing, disseminated within the command, and thoroughly understood by all leaders and soldiers.

DISSEMINATION OF CHANGES: Changes to ROE must also be made in writing and quickly disseminated within the command. ROE are so important that command emphasis is needed to ensure that prompt, written dissemination of changes is carried out by staff and subordinate commanders.

FOCUSED TRAINING: In an environment where random shooting and sniping are prevalent or possible, only trained, disciplined soldiers are likely to exhibit the degree of restraint needed in operations other than war. Vignettes and situational training exercises, specifically focusing on ROE and led by NCOs, are essential in developing soldiers' skills on how to respond to a variety of situations, when to use deadly force, and when and how to apply nondeadly force.

FRONTLINE LEADERSHIP: When ROE are applied in actual situations, NCO leadership, experience, and maturity are always key factors in determining the appropriate response for the circumstances. Our experience in Somalia, Los Angeles, and Macedonia reaffirms the perennial lesson that good NCOs come from good soldiers, and good soldiers come from good recruiting.

STANDARDIZATION WITHIN A COALITION: When a command is made up of coalition forces application of ROE may vary based on the degree of emphasis placed on it by different coalition force commanders, variance in training among coalition forces, varying levels of experience by coalition forces in interacting with the local people, and differing interpretations of criteria outlining the graduated use of force. Senior coalition commanders must make a concerted effort to standardize interpretation and application of common ROE by all forces in the coalition.

LESSON(S): Soldiers must know and clearly understand the ROE.

TOPIC: Soldier Discipline.

DISCUSSION: The nature of the peacekeeping mission demands a high standard of discipline and, in particular, self-discipline. Commanders at all levels must be conscious of this and must give special attention to leading and supervising their soldiers.

LESSON(S):

- * A peacekeeping mission is meant to be visible to all concerned.
- * The force will be scrutinized by the locals, by possible belligerent forces, and international media.
- * The units must reflect vigilance, readiness, and competence in their duties.
- * Individuals in isolated observation posts and checkpoints may become bored with the daily routine.
- * Innovative leadership and motivation are required to keep up morale, maintain high standards of discipline, and avert boredom during operations.
- * Properly and continually brief all personnel to ensure everyone understands the mission, situation, and train on ROE.
- * Issue clear, concise, and simple orders.
- * Maintain high standards of cleanliness, care, and maintenance of all weapons, equipment, and uniforms.
- * Develop and enforce combat standards which address proper uniform, alcohol consumption, and force protection early in the operation.

TOPIC: Do's and Don'ts.

DISCUSSION: As a member of an organization which represents the United States and, possibly, the United Nations, your conduct, self-discipline and bearing will have a great influence on the success of the mission.

LESSON(S):

DO's

- * Be impartial.
- * Be tactful; use common sense and discretion.
- * Be inquisitive and observant.
- * Maintain a high standard of military bearing.
- * Make efforts to identify the local customs and obey all local laws.
- * Know the ROE.

DON'Ts

- * Discuss operations, plans, intentions, or techniques in the presence of unauthorized personnel.
- * Discuss or comment on the opposing forces except in the performance of duty.
- * Discuss religion or politics.
- * Discuss the composition, role, and employment of friendly forces.
- * Have commercial dealings with local forces.

TOPIC: Vehicular Survival.

DISCUSSION: Recent peace operations conducted by U. S. forces have shown that vehicular survival is a cause for concern. Leaders must ensure that all vehicles carry the equipment needed for recovery. Soldiers that ride in vehicles also need their personal equipment in case of a breakdown. Below is a suggested list of items that should be on each vehicle.

LESSON(S):

Vehicles should be equipped with the following:

- * OVE, to include a small general tool kit.
- * Flashlight.
- * Compass, binoculars and maps.
- * Communications equipment.
- * Tow rope/cable (at least 25 feet long).
- * Five gallons of water per vehicle.
- * Personal food, clothing, and equipment.
- * Siphoning hose (1/2 inch outside diameter by 6 feet) and funnel.

- * Slave cables (one for each group of vehicles).
- * Jack support plate (one foot by one foot piece of metal).
- * Consumables, to include oil, radiator hoses, fan belts, heavy duty tape, air and fuel filters.
- * Spare tire for HMMWVs.
- * Pepper Spray and CS to control small, unruly crowds.
- * Enough concertina to surround vehicle in case of a breakdown.
- * Layer sandbags in troop-carrying compartments of vehicles to protect personnel from landmines.
- * Rules for Travel: travel in pairs, file a movement plan and monitor times of arrival and departure.

TOPIC: Installation Security.

DISCUSSION: As commanders establish base camp areas and move into work facilities, they must balance their security measures with the type and level of threat posed by the groups in their area. This will apply both in the relative security of forward operating bases and at assigned facilities within cities. Further information is available in

FM 100-37, *Terrorism Counteraction*,

FM 90-12, *Base Defense*, and

Joint Pub 3-07.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Anti-terrorism*.

LESSON(S):

Security problems and shortfalls contributed to the failure of force protection programs during terrorist attacks against U.S. interests in the Middle East since the 1983 Beirut Bombings.

Operations in Somalia also pointed out that quality plans are not developed by base commanders to defend installations. A copy of a suggested checklist for use in developing defensive plans can be found in Appendix A.

Suggestions:

- * Build bases where they can be defended, not where they are convenient
- * Barrier systems were unreliable; vehicle access controls were inadequate. Use additional security measures, such as vehicles to block high speed avenues of approach.
- * Do not use solely host-nation personnel to provide perimeter security of any facility.
- * Make critical physical security improvements by installing additional barriers to screen high risk targets.
- * Ensure that the ROE does not limit the ability of the soldier to defend himself or the facilities.
- * Sensitive work areas must not be located in portions of buildings vulnerable to explosives.
- * Maintain the highest level of security procedures possible; trust your own judgement when it comes to security.
- * Request military working dogs for explosive detection.

TOPIC: Personal Awareness.

DISCUSSION: The single most proactive anti-terrorism measure is individual awareness - by soldiers on guard, while moving individually near or within the cantonment area, and while operating as a unit. Soldiers must look for things out of place, for example, packages left unattended, the same car parked near the front gate for an extended period of time, or the same person standing on a street corner daily. When combined with appropriate physical security measures, individual awareness and actions will defeat the terrorist plans.

LESSON(S):

The following procedures have proven effective in operations other than war where a significant terrorist threat existed:

- * Reinforce individual security awareness by reminding soldiers to report suspicious activities and out-of-place objects.
- * Use a tactical versus an administrative posture when moving. Treat everything as a combat operation.
- * Commanders must provide soldiers with the threat level daily.
- * Limit access to information about planned events, to include personnel movements and recreational activities.
- * Employ security measures in an unpredictable, random fashion, including security checks outside perimeters.
- * Maintain an adequate response force.
- * Ensure soldiers understand the ROE.
- * Impose substantial limitations on off-post travel.
- * Employ helicopters during hours of darkness, to conduct random patrols along perimeters.
- * Ensure soldiers remain alert, do not establish a routine, and keep a low profile.

TOPIC: Liaison Officers (LOs).

DISCUSSION: Experience has shown that the use of LOs can make a significant contribution to the success of the mission. Individuals serving as LOs may be able to help resolve inter-operability problems.

LESSON(S):

- * LOs can provide the commander an immediate channel of communication to effect operations that may impact on combined operations throughout the theater of operations.
- * Individuals who serve as Los should be high-quality and have sufficient rank and authority appropriate to their level of liaison.

* Considerations for liaison operations are:

*Identify LOs early in the planning process.

*LO functions are prescribed by the parent organization with the concurrence of the commander to whom they are assigned to assist.

*Los must be knowledgeable of the capabilities and limitations of their parent unit.

*Los should attend all briefings and maintain constant communication with their commander.

*Equip liaison teams with redundant communications systems to allow constant contact with the commander.

*Staff liaison teams with enough personnel to conduct 24-hour operations and to allow for the senior LO to travel with the allied commander when necessary.

*LO teams must be capable of accomplishing rapid detailed staff planning for the allied commander (especially staff estimates).

*Use language-qualified personnel as LOs, or include adequate linguists as part of the liaison team.

*Be prepared to establish liaison with the belligerent forces, relief agencies, host-nation government, local political groups, as well as adjacent and higher Hqs.

TOPIC: Language Capability and Use of Interpreters.

DISCUSSION: The U. S. Army has a very small pool of language-qualified individuals. Units assigned to peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions may not have adequate numbers of regionally oriented linguists. Some civil affairs (CA) teams may be available to help. During Operations DESERT STORM and RESTORE HOPE, the U. S. forces used contracted interpreters.

LESSON(S):

* The use of contracted interpreters, both from within and outside the United States works extremely well.

* While having language capability within CA teams and units is preferred, in operations other than war, such as RESTORE HOPE where the use and security of classified material is minimal, the use of contracted interpreter services is a more practical approach.

* Keep OPSEC in mind when using interpreters or when discussing future operations in their presence.

TOPIC: Sniper Threat.

DISCUSSION: Whether manning an observation post, conducting a patrol, or simply crossing an exposed area, a great threat to a soldier's personal safety is the sniper whose harassment of the intervening force is a routine fact of daily life. Sniper fire accounts for many of the casualties during peacekeeping operations. The bullet from a sniper's high-powered rifle passes easily through lumber and concrete blocks.

LESSON(S):

- * Units must take precautions to minimize the threat of snipers.
- * Develop a response technique for soldiers to use against snipers.
- * Designate specific weapon systems or soldiers to constantly scan for snipers.
- * Clear or occupy all buildings around checkpoints and OPs to eliminate potential sniper positions.
- * Adequate barriers and shields must be constructed around checkpoints and OPs to protect soldiers.
- * Shields and screens can be used in cantonment areas to block a sniper's vision as he scans for targets.
- * Individuals should stay away from windows or hang blankets over them to protect individuals inside.
- * The ROE needs to give specific instructions on how to react to sniper fire. It should address any restrictions on weapons used to engage snipers.
- * Units can use specific weapons and teams, such as sniper teams, to eliminate the sniper and minimize collateral damage of civilian casualties.
- * A hand-held illuminator in combination with a night vision device (LPC 30 with PVS 4B or PVS 7B) will illuminate sniper optics.

TOPIC: Information Gathering.

DISCUSSION: Belligerent parties may perceive information gathering as a hostile act. Intelligence operations may, therefore, destroy the trust that the parties may have in the peace-keeping force. However, it is reasonable to assume that the parties will pursue their divergent aims by exploiting the presence of the force. They may even attempt to deceive it from time to time. Circumstances may place the force under direct attack. Such attacks may come from one of the parties to the agreement, or from extremist elements acting independently. This poses a serious problem, but whatever the circumstances, the soldier needs information.

LESSON(S):

- * Plan for, and use, overhead imagery support to plan operations.
- * Every item of operational information becomes important during peacekeeping operations.
- * Members of a force have to be information-conscious at all times.
- * Soldiers must remain constantly alert to what takes place around them and to any change or inconsistency in the behavior, attitude, and activities of the military and civilian populace.
- * HUMINT may be the most available source of information.

TOPIC: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).

DISCUSSION: The IPB process continues to provide commanders and staffs a logical and systematic frame of reference from which critical analysis and viable courses of action can be developed. Uniqueness of conducting peace enforcement missions in a humanitarian assistance operational environment has rendered some of the traditional IPB products (warfighting templates) nonapplicable. However, U. S. forces in Somalia adapted IPB methodology and internally merged requirements of humanitarian assistance, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping operations. Review both FM 31-130 and FM 100-20 to assist in IPB for operations other than war.

LESSON(S):

- * During operations other than war, the IPB process is still a valuable tool used by both commanders and staffs as a framework for organizing the thought processes and in analyzing the situation.
- * The IPB process is flexible enough that soldiers can substitute or eliminate portions of the process according to situational needs.
- * IPB for peace enforcement operations should include:
 - * Key terrain and Lines of Communications (LOCs).
 - * Cross-country mobility.
 - * Ethnic and religious lines of confrontation.
 - * Combatants' disposition and strength.
 - * Identification of the tactical centers of gravity.
 - * Human Intelligence (HUMINT).

TOPIC: Use of Standardized Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) Checklist.

DISCUSSION: Units dramatically improve their nontraditional intelligence collection efforts by developing detailed PIR checklists. In operations other than war, PIR may be considerably different than normally expected in a combat environment. In Somalia, checklists were developed for each of the following five mission areas:

- * Area Assessment Checklist
- * Patrol Checklist.
- * Convoy Debrief Checklist.
- * Roadblock Checklist.
- * Airfield Security Checklist.

There are example checklists in Appendix A.

LESSON(S):

- * Use of a standardized checklist can greatly enhance the intelligence collection effort and minimize trainup time.
- * Units presented with nontraditional intelligence requirements should develop detailed checklists to ensure the collection effort is standardized and complete.

TOPIC: Psychological Operations (PSYOP).

DISCUSSION: PSYOP can assist the command through persuasion rather than intimidation. Through such local information programs as radio and television newscasts, and leaflet distribution, PSYOP can help ensure that objectives and efforts are fully understood and supported by all.

LESSON(S):

- * PSYOP can help promote acceptance of a cease-fire, withdrawal of troops, and compliance with security agreements by influencing attitudes, emotions, opinions, and behavior. *
- Such efforts can help counter rumors and disinformation and may even resolve some problems between the parties while the search for a long-term solution to the conflict is ongoing.
- * PSYOP and Public Affairs (PA) personnel must coordinate their statements. Information should be timely, correct, and complete.
- * There will be PSYOP campaigns directed against U. S. forces that prey on the vulnerabilities of the population.

TOPIC: Negotiation and Mediation.

DISCUSSION: Leaders may find themselves in the role of negotiator, mediator, and even arbitrator at the point of confrontation. If possible, negotiations on matters affecting both parties should be carried out jointly with the two sides. On occasion, relations between them may be so strained that the peacekeeper has to serve as an intermediary. A negotiator must be firm, fair and polite if he is to gain and keep the trust of both parties. The qualities required of the negotiator are mastery of detail, tact, patience, a sense of proportion, resourcefulness, objectivity and impartiality. On matters of principle, he must be insistent without being belligerent. He must be careful not to pass the confidences of one side on to the other.

LESSON(S):

- * Negotiations are not always successful. Agreements of all parties may or may not occur.
- * Remember to remain neutral and do not allow yourself to be used by either belligerent.
- * Expect some of the belligerents to negotiate in bad faith. They may attempt to twist the issues to prolong negotiations while they continue to violate peace agreements.
- * Negotiations are time-consuming and often frustrating. However, negotiation reduces unnecessary loss of life and offers the best long-term prospects for a final peaceful settlement. It is vital to remain impartial and courteous at all times.

Some helpful hints for conducting negotiations are:

Familiarize yourself with the problem.

- * Collect all available evidence.
- * Determine if the point of issue has been raised before.
- * Find out what agreements or understandings have a bearing on the problem.
- * Be certain of the peacekeeping forces policy on the problem.

Prepare for the negotiation.

- * Select and prepare a meeting place acceptable to both parties.
- * Obtain adequate interpreters and communications assets.
- * Secure the meeting area and delegates from attack.
- * Ensure that a common map edition and scale are used by both sides and the peacekeeping force.
- * Keep your headquarters informed.

Conduct Negotiations.

- * Remember to exchange customary salutations and courtesies.
- * Introduce yourself and any advisers. Make sure all the delegates are introduced by name.
- * Use some introductory small talk to make the delegates feel at ease and to assess their mood.
- * Allow each side to state his case without interruption and without making any premature judgements or concessions. Make a record of the issues presented by each side.
- * If one side makes a statement which is known to be incorrect, be prepared to produce evidence or proof to establish the facts.
- * If there is a peacekeeping force-preferred solution, present it and encourage both sides to accept it.
- * Be sure to close the meeting by explaining to both sides exactly what has been agreed upon and what action they are expected to take. Be prepared to present this in writing for signatures if necessary.

CHAPTER IV

Preventive Medicine for the Soldier

GENERAL: There is no reason to fear the Haitian environment, and it should not adversely affect your morale if you are prepared for it, provided you take certain precautions to protect yourself.

Recent medical and dental exams should ensure that the soldier is in good health. Carry appropriate health and accident insurance documents and copies of any important medical records. Bring an adequate supply of all prescriptions and other medications as well as any necessary personal hygiene items, including a spare pair of eyeglasses or contact lenses if necessary.

Drink only bottled beverages (including water) preferably carbonated, or beverages made with boiled water. Do not use ice cubes or eat raw seafood, rare meat or dairy products. Eat well-cooked foods while they are still hot and fruits that can be peeled without contamination. Avoid roadside stands and street vendors. **BOTTOM LINE:** Eat and drink only those foods and beverages that have been approved for consumption by the command.

Swim only in well-maintained, chlorinated pools or ocean water known to be free from pollution; avoid freshwater lakes, streams and rivers. Wear clothing which reduces exposed skin and apply repellents containing DEET to remaining areas. Sleep in well-secured accommodations with bednetting as appropriate. Carry antidiarrheal medication. Reduce problems related to sun exposure by using sunglasses, wide-brimmed hats, sunscreen lotions and lip protection. Avoid petting stray animals and do not adopt animals as pets or unit mascots.

Based on operations in Somalia, soldiers that slept on the ground became ill. To help ensure that soldiers remain healthy, commanders should supply them with cots, mosquito nets, and head nets.

TOPIC: Communicable Diseases.

DISCUSSION: Communicable diseases are illnesses that can be transmitted from one person to another or from animal to person. These diseases are caused by: direct contact with infected person(s); exposure to bodily discharges; bites of animals; insects and rodents; air; food; water, and milk products. Communicable diseases can be broken down into five different categories. They are: respiratory diseases (common cold and pneumonia), intestinal diseases (dysentery, cholera, typhoid, paratyphoid fevers), insect-borne diseases (malaria, typhus, yellow fever, dengue), sexually transmitted diseases (syphilis, gonorrhea, chancroid, AIDS), and miscellaneous diseases (tetanus, rabies, dermatophytosis, tuberculosis). Above all, **PERSONAL HYGIENE** is the most important factor in the prevention of communicable diseases.

LESSON(S):

- * Control the source of the disease through:
 - * Isolation of sick person (Quarantine).
 - * Treatment.
 - * Maintain a high state of personal hygiene
- * Control means of transmission:
 - * Properly ventilate living quarters.
 - * Purify water.
 - * Mess sanitation.
 - * Properly dispose of body waste.
 - * Control disease-carrying insects.
 - * Practice good personal hygiene.

TOPIC: Respiratory Diseases.

DISCUSSION: Respiratory infections account for the highest incidence of disease in the U. S. Army. While troops are affected, the highest rates of infection occur in personnel unfamiliar with the surrounding conditions.

LESSON(S): The difficulty in the prevention and control of respiratory diseases lies in the fact that most individuals are susceptible to them. Another problem is that the people transmit the disease before they realize they are infectious. The most important control measures to prevent respiratory diseases are:

- * Separate all known cases from healthy persons.
- * Quarantine and surveillance contacts.
- * Immunize.
- * Avoid overcrowding (minimum 55 square feet of floor space in sleeping areas).
- * Personal Hygiene.

TOPIC: Personal Hygiene.

DISCUSSION: Personal hygiene is necessary for the individual to safeguard his own health and the health of others. Carelessness of one member of a unit in regard to personal hygiene may lead to disease that may incapacitate the entire unit. Leaders must check soldiers daily to ensure that they are performing their personal hygiene. Personal hygiene includes, but is not limited to, washing the face and hands, shaving, changing uniform (or at least socks and underwear), brushing teeth, and combing hair.

LESSON(S):*** Individual:**

- * Understand and continually apply personal measures.
- * Seek needed medical care.
- * Do not resort to self-treatment.

*** Medical:**

- * Conduct instruction in personal hygiene.
- * Conduct inspections of facilities and troops.
- * Provide medical treatment.

*** Commanders:**

- * Provide and maintain facilities.
- * Ensure the practice of personal hygiene through inspections.
- * Deploy with adequate buckets and soap so soldiers can wash personal clothing until laundry facilities are established.
- * Deploy with Australian showers.

TOPIC: Potable Water.

DISCUSSION: Safe potable water is essential to the U. S. Army. Water that is not properly treated can transmit such diseases as typhoid and paratyphoid fevers, bacillary dysentery, cholera, poliomyelitis, and common diarrhea. In some areas, water may also be the means of transmitting infectious hepatitis, schistosomiasis, and amoebic dysentery. Lessons from Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM showed that units should use a planning factor of at least 7 gallons of water per soldier per 24-hour period.

LESSON(S): Treat the individual water supply with one iodine tablet per quart-size canteen if the water is clear, two tablets if the water is cloudy. Let stand for 5 minutes with the cap loosened and shake to permit leakage to rinse the thread around the neck. Tighten cap, and let stand for 20 minutes. Calcium hypochlorite may be used. Add one ampule in one-half canteen cup of water, dissolve, then pour one canteen cap of the solution in the canteen, shake and let stand for 30 minutes.

WATER CONTAINERS: The best containers for small quantities of water (5 gallons) is plastic water cans. Water in plastic cans will be good up to 72 hours, compared to metal which will only be good for 24 hours. However, you should change the water in your canteen at least every 24 hours. Water in trailers, if kept in the shade, will last up to 5 days. If the temperature outside exceeds 100F, the temperature of your water must be monitored, and when it exceeds 92F, it should be changed, as bacteria will multiply. If not changed, you will end up with a case of diarrhea. Ice in containers will keep water cool. If ice is put in the water trailers, the ice in it must be removed before the trailer is moved as the floating ice may destroy the inner protection of the trailer.

TOPIC: Malaria.

DISCUSSION: Malaria is wide-spread throughout Haiti. It is a serious disease which is spread through the bite of the female anopheles mosquito. Reports from operations in Somalia indicate that antimalarial medications may be harmful to an unborn fetus. Pregnant soldiers should consult their physicians before taking the medication. Post deployment follow-up consultation and treatment are also recommended.

LESSON(S): To protect soldiers, units should:

- * Destroy mosquitoes and the control of breeding areas, by draining standing water.
- * Screen troop areas.
- * Locate camps away from infested areas.
- * Use sprays and aerosol dispensers NSN 6840-00-253-3892 and NSN 6840-00-823-7849.
- * Ensure soldiers use netting at night.
- * Wear protective clothing.
- * Soldiers should use chemical repellents.
- * Take antimalarial medication.

TOPIC: Heat Injuries.

DISCUSSION: The most frequently encountered types of heat injury are heat exhaustion and heat cramps. Less common, but of greater significance, is heat stroke. Causes of most heat injuries are the loss of salt and water from the body and failure of the sweat mechanism with a resultant increase of body temperature (heat stroke).

Heat cramps are primarily caused by excessive loss of salt from the body. The symptom is extremely painful contraction of the voluntary muscles, especially in the abdomen.

Heat exhaustion is caused by excessive loss of water and salt from the body. The symptoms include profuse perspiration, pallid skin, low blood pressure and other manifestations of peripheral circulatory collapse. Soldiers may also complain of headache, mental confusion, drowsiness, extreme weakness, vomiting, and visual disturbances.

Heat stroke IS A MEDICAL EMERGENCY. Symptoms include extreme high body temperature, total absence of perspiration or sweating and skin which is red and hot to the touch. Also the individual is usually in a profound coma. Heat stroke is a breakdown in the body's heat regulating mechanism. Individuals who have not been acclimatized are especially prone to heat stroke.

LESSON(S): Prevention of heat injury involves the application of measures for increasing the resistance of exposed persons and reducing the exposure as much as practicable. The following are ways to prevent heat injuries:

- * Encourage soldiers to drink water; thirst is not a good indicator of a heat injury.
- * Encourage proper salt intake - do not use salt tablets.
- * Gradually acclimatize soldiers to hot climates.
- * Maintain the best physical condition of personnel.
- * Tailor work schedules to fit the climate.
- * Protect soldiers from the environment by ensuring they wear loose clothing to permit air circulation.
- * Take frequent rest breaks- in the shade if possible.
- * Educate personnel to recognize early signs, take appropriate action, and apply effective first aid.

TOPIC: Field Sanitation.

DISCUSSION: The role of field sanitation (ref: AR 40-5, FM 21-10) is to aid the unit in protecting the health of troops. Field sanitation concerns itself with the basic responsibilities of:

- * Personal hygiene and protective measures.
- * Water supplies.
- * Mess sanitation.
- * Waste disposal.
- * Insect and rodent control.
- * Troop education.

LESSON(S): Methods for field sanitation include the following:

- * Plan for garbage/rubbish disposal by burial or incineration.
- * Plan for liquid waste disposal. Use soakage pits, soakage trenches and evaporation beds.
- * Plan for body waste disposal. Use cat-hole latrine for marches, straddle trench for 1- to 3-day bivouac sites, deep-pit latrine for temporary camps, burn-out latrines and soakage pits for urinals.
- * Plan to take lime with you.

Latrines must be located at least 100 meters from unit messes and at least 100 meters from any water source. Garbage must be buried at least 100 feet from any water source.

CHAPTER V

Common Haitian Conversational Phrases

SAY IT IN CREOLE PRONUNCIATION GUIDE

Creole is written phonetically. Each letter is pronounced, and each word is spelled as it is pronounced. Creole has only been recognized as the official language of Haiti in the last few years. Therefore, there are many different ways in which the Haitians write and spell Creole words. There is an official standard that has been set, and this standard will be maintained in this publication. The following is a pronunciation guide using this standard; most of the sounds are French.

ch- <u>share</u>	<u>chache</u> -to look for
o-cl <u>aw</u>	<u>fo</u> -strong
e- <u>aim</u>	<u>ede</u> -to aid, help
ou- <u>you</u>	<u>ou</u> -you
e- <u>leg</u>	<u>mesi</u> -thank you
r-(not rolled)	<u>respire</u> -to breathe
g-go	<u>gen</u> -to have
I- <u>see</u>	<u>isit</u> -here
s-(always s)	<u>prese</u> -in a hurry
j-(avoid the d sound)	<u>jou</u> -day
y- <u>yes</u>	<u>pye</u> -foot
o- <u>toe</u>	<u>zo</u> -bone

There are nasal sounds in Creole just as there are nasal sounds in French, which are pronounced partially through the nose, but without the "n" itself pronounced (a rare exception to the general pronunciation rule of pronouncing every letter). Some English equivalents which come close to the nasal sounds are as follows:

an- <u>alms</u>	<u>dan</u> -tooth
en- <u>chopin</u>	<u>pen</u> -bread
on- <u>don't</u>	<u>bon</u> -good

- A. When a nasal sound is followed by another "n", or "m," the nasal sound is pronounced, then the "n" or "m" is pronounced separately.
- B. If an accent is placed over the vowel, there is no nasal sound.
- C. In never indicates a nasal sound.

The letter c is only used in the ch combination.

The letter k is used for the hard sound.

The letter s is used for the soft sound.

KEY CREOLE WORDS AND PHRASES SAY IT IN CREOLE

CREOLE	ENGLISH
Bonjou!	- Good morning!
Bonswa!	- Good afternoon!/Evening! (used after 11 AM)
Komon ou ye?	- How are you?
*N'ap boule!	- Good!
(*most common greeting and response)	
Wi	- Yes
yo	- they, them
Non	- No
Mesi	- Thanks
Anmwe!	- Help!
Non, mesi	- No, thanks
Souple	- Please
Merite	- You're welcome
Pa gen pwoblem	- No problem
Oke	- OK
Eskize mwen	- Excuse me
Mwen regret sa	- I'm sorry
Gen...	- There is/are...
Pa genyen!	- There is/are not any!
Mwen pa genyen!	- I don't have any!
Sekonsa!	- That's right!
Piti piti	- A little bit
Anpil	- A lot
Gen anpil...	- There are a lot of...
Isit	- Here
La	- There
Tout bagay anfon?	- Is everything OK?
Pa kounye-a	- Not now
Toupatou	- Everywhere
Anyen	- Nothing
Preske	- Almost
Atansyon!	- Attention!/Watch out!
Prese prese!	- Hurry!
Dife!	- Fire!
Rete!	- Stop!
Kounye-a	- Now
Nou ap chache...	- We are looking for...
Souple, ban mwen...	- Please give me...
Separe sa ant nou	- Divide this among you

Ye
 Jodia
 Demen
 Maten an
 Apremidi a
 Aswe a
 lendi
 madi
 mekredi
 jedi
 vandredi
 samdi
 dimanch
 Ou byen?
 Mwen pa two byen
 Mwen malad
 Te gen yon aksidan
 Nou bezwen yon dokte/yon
 mis touswit
 Kote Iopital la?
 Kote li ou fe mal?
 Li ansent
 Mwen pa ka manje/domi
 Mwendjare
 Mwen anvi vonmi
 Tout ko mwen cho
 Mwen toudi
 Nou bezwen pansman/koton
 Mwen bezwen yon bagay pi
 blese sa a
 Ou gen SIDA
 Mwen grangou
 Mwen swaf anpil
 Nou ta vle manje
 maten an
 midi a
 aswe a
 Konben
 Poukisa?
 Kote?
 Kisa?
 Kile?
 Ki moun?
 Kijan?
 Kiles?

- Yesterday
 - Today
 - Tomorrow
 - This morning
 - This afternoon
 - This evening
 - Monday
 - Tuesday
 - Wednesday
 - Thursday
 - Friday
 - Saturday
 - Sunday
 - You OK?
 - I'm not too well
 - I'm sick
 - There was an accident
 - We need a doctor/a nurse
 right now
 - Where is the hospital?
 - Where does it hurt you?
 - She's pregnant
 - I cannot eat/sleep
 - I have diarrhea
 - I feel nauseated
 - My whole body is hot
 - I'm dizzy
 - We need bandages/cotton
 - I need something for this
 cut
 - You have AIDS
 - I'm hungry
 - I'm very thirsty
 - We would like
 - breakfast
 - lunch
 - supper
 - How much?/How many?
 - Why?
 - Where?
 - What?
 - When?
 - Who?
 - How?
 - Which?

Eske gen...?
 Eske ou gen...?
 Eske ou ka ede nou, souple?
 Kote nou ka achte...?
 Eske ou ka di mwenn...?
 montre. ...?
 ban...?
 Ki moun ki la?
 Kisa ou vle?
 Kisa ou ta vle?
 Kisa ou ap fe la?
 Kisa sa a ye?
 Sa k'genyen?
 Kisa pi nou fe?
 Eske ou te we...?
 Eske ou pale angle/franse?
 Ki moun isit ki pale angle?
 Ou konprann?
 Kij an yo rele sa an kreyol?
 Kij an yo di...an kreyol?
 Kisa ou bezouen?
 Kisa ki rive ou?
 Ki kote li ale?
 Kilaj ou?
 Kote ou rete?
 Eske ou gen petit?
 Kote nou ye?
 genyen
 chita
 manje
 rete
 kouri
 kouche
 vini
 ale/prale
 ban
 rete trankil
 pran
 leve
 sede
 touye
 frape
 kache
 konnen
 manti

- Is/Are there...?
 - Do you have...?
 - Can you help us please?
 - Where can we buy...?
 - Can you tell me...?
 - show...?
 - give...?
 - Who is there?
 - What do you want?
 - What would you like?
 - What are you doing there?
 - What is that?
 - What's the matter?
 - What must we do?
 - Have you seen...?
 - Do you speak English/French?
 - Who speaks English here?
 - You understand?
 - What do they call that in Creole?
 - How do they say... in Creole?
 - What do you need?
 - What happened to you?
 - Where did he go?
 - How old are you?
 - Where do you live?
 - Do you have any children?
 - Where are we?
 - to have
 - to sit
 - to eat
 - to stop
 - to run
 - to lie down
 - to come
 - to go
 - to give
 - to be quiet
 - to get, receive
 - to get up
 - to give up
 - to kill
 - to hit
 - to hide
 - to know
 - to lie (not truth)

gade
koupe
kwit-manje, fe-manje
fimen
atake
ban pemi
kri
achte
fe-apel
netwaye
femen
fose
fini
obeyi
fe - konfyans
console
pati
mouri
fe-desen
bwe
tonbe
mete abo
atoure
ranfose
ou
mwen
nou
li

- to look
- to cut
- to cook
- to smoke
- to attack
- to authorize
- to shout, yell, scream
- to buy
- to call, name
- to clean
- to close
- to coerce, force
- to finish
- to obey
- to trust
- to comfort
- to leave, depart
- to die
- to draw, sketch
- to drink
- to drop, fall
- embark, load, board
- to surround
- to enforce
- you, your
- I, me, my, mine
- us, our, you (plural)
- him, her, his, hers

APPENDIX A

Checklists

Area Assessment Checklist

A standardized checklist can enhance the intelligence collection effort and minimize train-up time for 52 sections. The Area Assessment Checklist below was developed by U. S. forces during Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia to enhance the intelligence collection effort during operations other than war. For additional guidance, see Appendix B, FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations. Use the following checklist as a guide to develop a standardized area assessment checklist for operations in Haiti.

- ** Where are the refugees originally from?
What is the size of the original population?
What is the size of the area and population that the village services in the surrounding countryside?
What is the size of the refugee population?
Why did they come here?
What is the relationship of the village with the surrounding villages?
Are they related?
Do they support each other?
Are they hostile toward each other?
Is any portion of the village population discriminated against?
- ** What is the food and water status of the village?
Where do they get their food?
What other means of subsistence are available?
Are the villagers farmers or herders?
What is the status of their crops/herds?
What is the quality of the water source?
- ** What is the medical status of the village?
What services are available in the village?
What is the location of the nearest medical facility?
Is there evidence of illness and/or starvation?
What portion of the population is affected?
What is the death rate?
What diseases are reported in the village?
- ** What civilian organization exists in the village?
Who are its leaders?
- ** What civil/military organizations exist in the village?
Who are its leaders?

- ** What organization/leadership element does the general population seem to support or trust the most?
Which organization seems to have the most control in the village?
- ** What UN relief agencies operate in the village?
Who are its representatives?
What services do they provide?
What portion of the population do they service?
Do they have an outreach program for the surrounding countryside?
- ** What is the security situation in the village?
What element(s) is the source of the problems?
What types and quantities of weapons are in the village?
What are the locations of minefields?
- ** What commercial or business activities are present in the village?
What services or products do they produce?
- ** Determine the groups in the village that are the most in need.
What are their numbers?
Where did they come from?
How long have they been there?
What are their specific needs?
- ** What civic employment projects would the village leaders like to see started?
- ** Determine the number of families in the village.
What are their names (family)?
How many in each family?
- ** What food items are available in the local market?
What are the cost of these items?
Are relief supplies being sold in the market?
If so, what items, what is their source, and what is the price?
- ** What skilled labor or services are available in the village (non-HRA)?
- ** What is the size of any transient population in the village?
Where did they come from, and how long have they been there?

Checkpoint and Roadblock Priority Intelligence Requirement (FIR) Checklist

The force can gain valuable intelligence information while operating checkpoints. The checklist below was developed during operations in Somalia to help standardize the intelligence collection effort. This list is not all inclusive, but gives suggestions into many areas of importance at checkpoints and roadblocks.

- * Report number and type of vehicles stopped.
- * Report identifying markings, license plate numbers, and a description of the vehicle.
- * Report number of passengers in the vehicle.
- * Report age and sex mix of passengers.
- * Report type and quantity of cargo.
- * Report point of origination and destination of vehicle.
- * Report stated reason for travel by passengers.
- * Report any weapons found in the vehicles.
- * Report any sightings of weapons or bandits by passengers.
- * Report condition of passengers (general health, dress, and attitude).
- * Report anything unusual reported by passengers.

Convoy Debrief Checklist

The use of a standardized checklist can greatly enhance the intelligence collection effort and minimize train-up time. Units presented with nontraditional intelligence requirements should develop a detailed checklist to ensure the completeness and standardization of the collection effort. Use a convoy checklist to debrief convoy personnel to ensure the standardization of the intelligence collection effort. Use the following checklist as an example.

- * Use a SALUTE report when reporting the size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment of belligerents seen during a convoy.
- * Report any changes in road conditions (potholes, collapsed culverts, damaged bridges).
- * Report acts of violence directed toward the convoy (aiming of weapons, rock throwing, location and number of personnel).
- * Report incidents of hostile intent by civilians directed toward the convoy (shouting, jeering, impeding operations, number of personnel, nature of incident, location).
- * Report incidents of shots fired at or around a convoy (location, number of personnel, type weapons, action taken, casualties).

* Report incidents of convoys being stopped by or harassed by roadblocks (location, number of personnel, nature of incident, action taken).

* Report thefts from convoys (items taken, description of thief, location, action taken).

Patrol Checklist

The Patrol Checklist below was developed during operations in Somalia to standardize the intelligence collection effort. Use this example to develop an appropriate checklist for operations in Haiti.

1. BELLIGERENTS PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS:

Will the belligerents interfere with U. S. operations? If so, how and under what circumstances?

a. Indicators:

- (1) Anti-U. S. demonstrations.
- (2) Hostile or uncooperative behavior toward U. S. forces.
- (3) Stealing or destroying U. S. equipment or property.
- (4) Presence of enemy weapon and supply caches.
- (5) Attacks on U. S. forces.
- (6) Disruptions of humanitarian relief agency (HRA) operations.

b. Security Operations Reports:

- (1) Report anti-U. S. graffiti, picket signs, leaflets, or derogatory speeches made by Haitians.
- (2) Report gatherings of Haitians (10 or more).
- (3) Report the establishment of road blocks or control points by Haitians.
- (4) Report attempts to impede or disrupt U. S. operations.
- (5) Report losses of equipment and supplies.
- (6) Report possession of U. S. equipment or property by Haitians.
- (7) Report all weapons (type, quantity, condition) and supply caches found.
- (8) Report all attacks (direct fire, indirect fire and rock throwing, etc.) on U. S. forces.
- (9) Report sightings of Haiti trucks with external fuel tanks.

- (10) Report sightings of any armed Haiti forces (vehicles with mounted weapons and dismounted groups of five or more).
- (11) Report sightings of weapons systems to include APCs, tanks, artillery, mortars, AAA guns, and AT guns.
- (12) Report locations of minefields and indications of mines being used as booby traps).
- (13) Report attempts to interfere with or disrupt humanitarian relief agency (HRA) operations.
- (14) Report location and size of refugee camps.
- (15) Report changes in the conditions or activities within refugee camps and villages.
- (16) Report all encounters with civilians. Determine feelings and attitudes toward U. S. forces.
- (17) Report names of known or suspected clan leaders/elders.
- (18) Report known or suspected existences of inter- and intra-clan rivalries.

2. GENERAL POPULATION PIR: What is the status and condition of the general population?

a. Indicators:

- (1) Requests from civilian population for food, water, or medical support.
- (2) Civilians appearing in need of food or medical attention.
- (3) Presence of food and water supplies.
- (4) HRA operations in area.

b. SORs:

- (1) Report all requests from the civilian population for food, water, or medical attention.
- (2) Report civilians appearing in need of food or medical attention.
- (3) Report civilians complaining of robberies, violence, or acts of intimidation.
- (4) Report HRAs operating in area; include POC and location.
- (5) Report supplies of food and water; include livestock.
- (6) Report general attitude of population about U. S. presence.
- (7) Report general daily activities.
- (8) Report approximate size of villages.
- (9) Report age distribution of population.
- (10) Report names of English-speaking civilians.
- (11) Report all changes in daily routines of the population.
- (12) Report primary means of income.
- (13) Report means of transportation available.
- (14) Report road conditions/trafficability.

Airfield Security Checklist

The airfield security checklist below was developed during operations in Somalia to standardize the intelligence collection effort. Use this checklist as an example to develop an airfield security checklist for operations in Haiti.

PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS: Will the belligerents attempt to gain unauthorized entry onto the U. S. base? If so, when, where, how, and for what purpose?

a. Indicators:

- (1) Hostile or uncooperative behavior toward U. S. forces.
- (2) Stealing or destroying U. S. equipment or property.
- (3) Presence of enemy weapons and supply caches.
- (4) Attacks on U. S. forces.

b. Security Operations Reports:

- (1) Report unauthorized Haitians on the airfield complex.
- (2) Report the establishment of road blocks or control points by Haitians.
- (3) Report attempts to impede or disrupt U. S. operations.
- (4) Report losses of equipment and supplies.
- (5) Report possession of U. S. equipment or property by Haitians.
- (6) Report all weapons (type, quantity, condition) and supply caches found.
- (7) Report all attacks (direct fire, indirect fire and rock throwing, etc.) on U. S. forces.
- (8) Report sightings of any armed Haiti forces (vehicles and dismounted groups).
- (9) Report sightings of weapons systems to include APCs, tanks, artillery, mortars, AAA guns, and AT guns.
- (10) Report locations of booby traps.
- (11) Report civilian vehicles (type vehicle, cargo, number of personnel, weapons)

Base Defense Plans

The following checklist was developed by the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) during operations in Somalia. It was used to ensure that all bases and installations had a good defensive plan. It was also used to provide necessary information to subordinate leaders in the QRF who might have to react to a crisis. The checklist is a modification of the checklist found in FM 90-12, Base Defense. These examples are based on the warn-deny-detect-delay-and-destroy response guidance provided in the FM. Use the checklist on the following page and the checklist from FM 90-12 as guidelines when developing a checklist for operations in Haiti.

BASE DEFENSE INFORMATION

BASE_____

DATE_____

COMMANDER OF BASE:_____

UNITS WITHIN BASE

POC/CDR

CALLSIGN/PHONE NO.

BASE DEFENSE OPERATIONS CENTER LOCATION_____

TELEPHONE NO./CALLSIGN/FREQUENCY_____

HELIPAD LOCATION/CAPABILITY_____

DEFENSIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF EACH UNIT:

UNIT

RESPONSIBILITY

ADDITIONAL BASE DEFENSE FORCES:

OIC/NCOIC	MEMBERS	UNIT	WEAPONS/EQUIP
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

ASSEMBLY AREA _____

SIGNAL FOR ASSEMBLY _____

DATE BASE DEFENSE DRILL LAST TESTED _____

CREW SERVED FIGHTING POSITIONS ASSIGNED:

POSITION	PERSONNEL	WEAPON	RANGE CARD
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

(INCLUDE DEFENSIVE SECTOR SKETCH AS AN ENCLOSURE.)

TENANT UNIT RESPONSE FORCES:

FORCES _____

POC/CDR _____

LOCATION _____

DATE LAST COORDINATION MADE _____

BARRIERS AND OBSTACLES:

TYPE

LOCATION

(INCLUDE OVERLAY.)

LP AND OP PLACEMENT:

LOCATION

WHEN OCCUPIED

COMMUNICATIONS

STANDARD REPORT FORMAT AND TIMES: _____

RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE: (INCLUDE ROUTE, CALLSIGN AND
FREQUENCY, RECOGNITION SIGNALS, DEPARTURE AND REENTRY POINT,
REACTION PLAN, INSTRUCTIONS TO
GUARD POST)_____

(INCLUDE OVERLAY.)

ACCESS PROCEDURES_____

(INCLUDE PROCEDURES AND ACCESS ROSTER FOR ACCESS TO THE BASE AND
THE CONTROLLED AREAS WITHIN THE BASE. ALSO INCLUDE CIVILIAN AND
LOCAL NATIONAL ACCESS PROCEDURES AND EXAMPLES OF ACCESS BADGES.)

INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT AVAILABLE FOR BASE DEFENSE:

UNIT	WEAPONS	HOW CONTACTED	LAST COORDINATION
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

CONTROL MEASURES:_____

DIRECT FIRE AIR SUPPORT AVAILABLE FOR BASE DEFENSE:

UNIT	WEAPONS	HOW CONTACTED	LAST COORDINATION
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

CONTROL MEASURES:_____

INTERNAL REACTION TEAM BATTLE DRILL FOR REACTING TO FIRE FROM
WITHIN THE BASE PERIMETER:_____

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (INCLUDE ANNEX AND VIGNETTES):

CROWD CONTROL PROCEDURES/GRADUATED RESPONSE
PROCEDURES:

LINKUP AND IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR SUPPORTING OR REINFORCING
FORCES:

ADJACENT BASE COORDINATION:

BASE ORGANIZATION	LOCATION	DATE LAST COORD

COALITION SUPPORT:

POC	SPT AVAILABLE	HOW CONTACTED	DATE LAST COORD

TACTICAL COMBAT FORCE:

COMMANDER/POC	SUPPORT AVAIL	LAST COORD

MEDICAL FACILITIES AND EVACUATION:

MEDICAL FACILITY	LOCATION	CALLSIGN/PHONE#
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

EVACUATION MODE	UNIT	HOW CONTACTED
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

COMMANDER'S LOCATION: _____
CALLSIGN/FREQUENCY/TELEPHONE# _____
PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED TO ACT OR SIGN FOR THE COMMANDER OF
BASE: _____

SIGNALS AUTHORIZED:
GROUND ATTACK: _____
ASSEMBLE ALL BASE DEFENSE FORCES: _____
OTHERS: _____